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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Dfi:SERET ARCHITECTS AND 
1%,.GINEERS and NORTHWEST-
ERN NATIONAL INSURANCE 
cmrPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
rrrn INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
f:iION" OF UTAH, MURREL 
HOCKENBURY, JR., TERMI-
XEX, INC., and THE STATE 
I:\SPRANCE FUND, 
Def endarnts. 
Case 
No.11139 
BRIEF O,F PLAINTIFFS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a review of proceedings before the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah culminating in an order by 
tlic Commission requiring that plaintiffs pay defendant 
:ilurrcl Hoe ken bury, Jr., compensation for injuries sus-
t;•in0d hy him at a time when he was on the payroll of 
di·fendant Terminex, Inc. 
1 
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STA'rEl\IEN'rS OJi' FACTS 
l\Iurrel Hockenbury, Jr. (herein call0d the "Ap]ili 
cant") has been employed for many years by df'i'en<laui 
'l'erminex, Inc. Terminex, Inc., is a corporation 01111p1] 
by George S. Nclsou and Associates, h0rein Romctirr11 ., 
referred to as "Nelson." At page 47 of the Reronl, Ap]r!i. 
cant testified that Nelson was "the owner" of TPrmi. 
nex, and couu;,,el stipulated that "George S. Nelson & 
Associates, besides doing business as Terminex of Ftn/., 
carry on a consulting engineering business" (RPcor1[ 
108). 
On January 16, 1967, the Applicant suffered the in-
jury which is the basis of the instant rlaim while rngager! 
in the collection of data for a fall-out shelter sumy. 
(Record 3) He was doing this work pursuant to a co:1 
tract between Nelson and Deseret Architects and Engi 
neers, herein called "plaintiff." (Record 70) :!\rl~n11 
is a consulting engineer whose business includes 1111• 
conduct of surveys. (Record 108) Applicant reportcdhi' 
injury to Nelson (Record 46) and Nelson dutifully filrrl 
its first report of injury as the "employer." (Reronl :11 
The busine8s of Terminex is pest extermination. y., 
estimate the volume of gas necessary for pest extern:: 
nation in a building, one must den~lop much the ~aru' 
information about the building as applicaut "·a~ 1·01ll'li 
ing for the fall-out shelter surny (see Data Colleetin! 
Forms at Record 81). From tim<' to time ~ince 101;:. 
,\.pplicant and f0llow Terminex employees Jwn heel! di 
n•rted to fall-out shelter sun'ey work h)· :X elson. (R,· 
ord 48) Tlwy have always been carried 011 the Tenui1"'' 
2 
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1
,,1: roll ,d1il<> engaged in ihe survey work even though 
.. , 11 n·L·ys" an~ more in the category of work done by 
\r·bon as a eo11snlting engineer and less in the category 
11 r ,rork doll<' by N"elson as a pest exterminator. 
In a ],out Odo her of 19G6, plaintiff called Nelson and 
1.,, 11 i rnded for seiTiees in much the same manner as any 
cu.,tomL'I' contrads for engineering services. The de-
taib of tliP agret>ment under which Nelson provided the 
'l'l'\'i('L'S \\'Cl'C: 
1. Th0 personnel engaged in the survey were car-
riPc1 011 the Nelson, i.e. Terminex, payroll. 
2. N Pl son assumed all "costs" involved in the 
employment relationship. Nelson, therefore, 
paid social security contributions, paid em-
ployme11t security taxes and accounted for ap-
plicant's withheld taxes. Moreover, compen-
sation insurance premium was paid by Nelson 
(the mrner of Terminex) on Applicant's wages 
paid during 1966 (the last accounting period 
for which data is available) including the 
m011ths he was engaged in the fall-out survey 
work (Record 110); there appears to have been 
no question, at that time, about which employ-
ing entity had the obligation to provide com-
pcmmtion coverage. 
3. Nelson had the right to recall Applicant from 
the survey at any time (Record 70). 
4-. N 0lso11 received from plaintiff for the services 
Nelson was provicling the amount of the wages 
paid the personnel engaged in the survey proj-
0ct plus 20% (Record 70). 
Applicant performed the work of the survey without 
'llP1'1Tision. The applicant's testimony (Record 42) is 
3 
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that he spent a day in plaintiff's office learning ho11,. tli 
prepare the forms specified by the U. S. Department of 
Defense, Office of Civil Defense (Record 81). Thereafter 
he conducted the survey without supervision althougl; 
plaintiff did communicate to him the descriptions of the 
areas to be encompassed by the survey. (Record 50
1 
52) 
In this regard, the instruction given by plaintiff to applJ. 
cant was no cliff Prent in kind from the instruction giwn 
by any client of a civil engineering firm who wants Janrl 
surveyed. 
It is significant, we believe, that Nelson had bm, 
on the previous occasions when applicant had clone fall. 
out shelter survey work, one of the agencies contractin~ 
directly with the Civil Defense Office to conduct the sur-
vey (Record 72). On those previous occasions, appli-
cant was clearly working for Nels on. The only differ. 
ence between the 1966 situation on the one hand and thr 
1962, 1964 situations on the other hand is that Nelson 
was receiving his profit as a contractor with the CiYil 
Defense Office on the earlier occasions and as a cnn· 
tractor with plaintiff on the latest occasion. There can 
be no question that the 20% of applicant's wages paid 
to Nelson covered more than employer's taxes and con· 
tributions based on payroll. That 20% coYerecl compen· 
sation insurance premiums and a generous contribution 
for Nelson's overhead, i.e. the costs of maintaining plant 
and supervisory staff. 
4 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
'l'he Commission found that applicant was an em-
ployee of plaintiff at the time of his injury and entitled 
tu compensation from plaintiff rather than from Nelson 
or Termiuex, Inc. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek an order of this court declaring the 
finding and conclusion of defendant Commission that 
applicant was an employee of plaintiff to be against the 
c1'iclc11ce and the law and remanding the cause for award 
against applicant's actual employer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION FOUND AN EMPLOY-
1\fENT RELATIONSHIP TO EXIST BE-
TWEEN PLAINTIFF AND APPLICANT IN 
THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPRESS OR IM-
PLIED CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
There is no question whatsoever about applicant's 
having entered into an employment relationship with 
Llefcndant Terminex, Inc., at some time before 1962. The 
contract was formal and unambiguous. Terminex, Inc. 
(George S. Nelson and Associates) recognized the rela-
tionship by all the formal payroll accounting procedures 
m111ired by law. Applicant recognized the employment 
relatiollship by following Nelson's instructions and doing 
the work Nelson, as the "owner" of Terminex, instructed 
him to do. On at least two occasions, Nels on instructed 
5 
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applicant to do fall-out shelter 8lUVPys when Ndson liail 
contracted with the Civil Defe11se Office for that work. It 
was a kind of work well within the scope of Nclsoii\ 
professional activity and a kind of work applicant hail 
been trained to perform as a Nelson employee. 
When, in 1966, applicant began doing fall-ont shelll'r 
surveys, there was 11 •J rupture of the employment rrla-
tionship both ~1e and Nelson recognized. Applicant \\'a' 
directed by Nelson (Record 28) to report to plaintiff', 
office, get in:-;tructions about where to conduct suney' 
and how to record the data, and proceed with that \\'ork 
unless and until he received other instructions from ):cl-
son who, under his contract with plai11tiff (Record iO) 
retained the right to pull applicant off snrvey work at 
any time. Applicant was continuing to do work he harl 
been trained to perform as a Nelson employee; hr woulrl 
continue to receive his checks from Nelson and he woul 1l 
hold himself ready to return to pest control employment 
at Nelson's command. Applicant's name continued \11 
appear on the Terminex payroll; employmrnt security , 
and social security contributions, payments required liy 
law to be made by "employers", were made hy Tcr· 
minex. In short, 'l'erminex marked itself as applicant'> 
employer by all the indicia which inhere in modern '1' 
counting procedures. 
On the other hand, there was never any communica- ' 
tion between plaintiff and applicant -which either could 
have interprr~ted as a contract negotiation. It is lr:l' 
that applicant began performing a service with rrfrrcm'.' 
to which he had to get general instructio11 from plaintirl. 
6 
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11111 the 011ly co11tract negotiated was the one between 
plaiutiff and Nelson. That contract, as both parties to 
it tef'tificd (Hecor<l 58, 70) provided that Nelson would 
ritain the ultimate right to control applicant and assume 
:ill tltc employer obligations of the employer-employee 
relationship. 
It is axiomatic that one becomes an employer or an 
employee only on the basis of a contract express or im-
pliPtl ( SPe ;)6 c .. J.S. 24, 35 Am. J ur. 450). There could 
linrdly he an implied contract that plaintiff was assum-
i11g employer obligations toward applicant when there 
1ras an e:rpress contract that Nelson was assuming them 
and applicant knew the terms of that express contract. 
The 'ingle act which most clearly reveals which entity 
: applicant lwlieYcd to be his "employer" and to have 
1·ompe11sation responsibilities with respect to him is this: 
\rl1en be sustained his injury, he reported it to Nelson, 
110! to plaintiff (Record 46). Moreover, Nelson imme-
diately filed the First Report of Injury (Record 3) as the 
1 
rmployer. 
POINT II. 
'l'HE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN 
BASING ITS CONCLUSION AS TO WHO 
WAS APPLICANT'S EMPLOYER ON THE 
EVIDENCE AS TO WHO GAVE DIRECTION 
RATHER THAN WHO HAD THE RIGHT TO 
CONTROL APPLICANT. 
ReYiPwing again the provisions of contract between 
l11 ni11tiff and Nr!son, they are these: 
7 
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1. Nelson would supply personnel trained to rlri 
the work. · 
2. Nelson c.ould withdraw them at his discretior
1 
at any time. 
3. Plaintiff would pay Nelson the wages of the 
Nels on employees assigned to the work plu, 
20%. 
4. Nelson would assume all employer obligation~ 
with reference to the employees assigned to 
the job. 
It is true that, to the degree applicant was directed 
in the conduct of the vrnrk, he recei;'ed his direction from 
plaintiff. His directions did not relate to the ni(];nner of 
performance but to the place of performance. So far a> 
the evidence shows, nobody at plaintiff's office knew how 
to direct applicant in the performance of the work; that\ 
why plaintiff contracted with Nelson. Applicant's tesli-
mony on the point is as follows : 
Q. The onlv communication vou had with Jlr. 
Christen.sen, or anyone at ·Deseret Engineer> 
-while 3'0u were engaged on these surveys-
was the communication you had in the morn-
ings, when you would pick up the instn1ction' 
about what areas to survey'? 
A. Right. Or any question that I might ban d\ir-
ing the day that I might call him and ask lnrn 
about. 
Q. How frequently did you do that? 
A. At least once a dav I tried to call in. 
· (Record fiO) 
Q. And what was the nature of these phon1 ~ c;u-\'ersations that you would haYe "~th urn. 
8 
l 
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A. Oh, some problem I'd run into of a building 
that wasn't on the survey, that I thought ought 
to be looked at, or some minor question. 
(Record 53) 
:\'enrtheless, it was on this eYi.dence of direction 
that the Industrial Commission concluded applicant had 
become plaintiff's employee. We submit that the desposi-
tire question in determining whether an employee has 
temporarily changed employers is not who gives direc-
tions but who has the basic right of control. 
The cases, in this jurisdiction and elsewhere, recog-
nize that there can be a situation where an employee of 
one rmployer becomes temporarily the employee of an-
other so that the second employer assumes the compensa-
tion responsibility. This is, of course, an unusual situa-
tion and is not to be implied whenever, for the benefit 
of his general employer, an individual submits condition-
ally and temporarily to direction from a third person. 
The editors of American Jurisprudence state the 
prerailing view succinctly at 58 Am. Jur. 812: 
" ... the rule may be stated to be that a general 
employer, that is, the employer contracting di-
rectly with the employee, is liable for workmen's 
compern;ation in the event of an injury to the 
employee unless it is shown by the terms of a loan 
hiring or similar arrangement that the general 
employer relinquished for the time being all pri-
111ary benefits a.nd substa.n.tial right to control ... " 
mmphasis added) 
It i~ oln'ious from the evidence in this case that N el-
.r,n tlid nut relinquish all primary benefits. He was being 
9 
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pai<l for the work on a cost pins 20j{ basis. It is tJ
1
,. 
grossest imposition 011 credulity for N t•lson to ('Ollti·nil 
that he recei\'ed snch a premium for tlw mere mai 111 ,.. 
nance of the applicant's payroll record. This kind ,11 
premium constitutes a primary be1wfit from the pci 
formance of the emplo~'ee. This is partienlarly trne ,int, 
the fall is the slack season for Terminex, and this i·r;11 . 
tract with plaintiff enabled Nelson to ke0p his labor forr1· 
and pro<luce revenue to defray costs of office overhea1i 
and general supervision. 
It is further evident that Nelson did not relinq11i,J1 
the right to control the applicant. It would ha\'C hrc11 
110 violation of his contract with plaintiff for Nrbon !11 
ban~ removed applicant from the civil clPfensc snrwr 
activity at any time. As a matter of fact, applicant l1i11: 
returned to his Terminex employment for the two or 
three davs before the accident (Record 45). Xebon'; 
• I 
right to withdraw Terminex employees at any time 1rn'. ! 
in fact, a primary term of the Deseret-N elson Ulllkr· / 
standing. This retained right is the fundamental right I 
of control. I 
I 
It is true, of course, that Deseret gaw appliea111 ! 
some instructions as to the scope of the work to be c~ow I 
Even if these iustructions constituted ''direction o! t!P I 
work,'' which we <lo not concede, the determining q\11" . 
tion is not who gives directions to the Pmployee hut wlw' 
has tl:e fundamental riglit to control. In Hean.11 Y. Pa 
A.rpi11 ra11 Li11es, 200 A.2d 592, the court rc\'ir,reil ti 
authorities and stated the test as follows: 
10 
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"the status of a person as an employee depends 
upon whether the employer has or has not re-
tained power of control or superintendence over 
him. Tlw final test is the right of the employer to 
L'X<'l"cise power of control rather than the actual 
exercise of such power.'' 
rrhen· are a number of cases (involving the rental 
of trador awl trailer rigs with drivers) which support 
the proposition that the giving of instructions by an 
al!Pged "special employer" a bout what goods should be 
mowd and where to pick up and deliver does not con-
'titnte the renter, even though he be in the same business, 
the employer of the driver of the renter rig. See Rantes 
\'. Jlicliacaggo Motor Exp., Inc., 52 NW 2d 602; Stine v. 
Borst, 205 A2d 650; Hargis v. United Tran.sports, 274, 
SW 2d 110. 
In Creech v. Sirkin, 88 SE 2nd 697, the Georgia 
l'ourt held that the exercise of day to day control over 
a huilding contractor's employees by a property owner 
did not create a special employment relationship even 
though the claimant believed the property owner had 
tl1e right to fire him. 
All these cases directly or indirectly state the con-
tept which is perhaps most significant in these special 
1·mployme11t cases, the concept that a new employment 
1·oI1tract is not lightly to be inferred. The :\fassachu-
'1·tts Court put it this way in Sargentelli's Case, 117 
~E ~rl 828: 
"The willingness of the employee to work under 
the direction of Vernon did not of itself make him 
11 
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r 
its employee of the new employer" ... "And to 
become an employee of the new employer Ven 
h t . ' IOU, e mus enter mto a new contract of emplov. 
ment." · 
It goes without saying that a new contract of em. 
ployment involves the meeting of the minds of both par 
ties to it. Plaintiff never negotiated with applicant 
with reference to conditions of employment or wages am! 
never recognized him as an employee in any of the 
myriad customary ways. So far as Deseret was con-
cerned, it was contracting with Nelson for a senice, 
not hiring employees. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the tests of special employment can be 
discerned in this case. The general employer, Nelsr111 
doing business as Terminex and as a consulting en~­
neer, had not relinquished the primary benefits of Ap 
plicant 's service nor the fundamental right to control 
that service. All the indicia inherent in recording keep· 
ing point to Nelson as the employer, and there is 11 11 
evidence of any contract or conversation which could be 
construed as a contract between Deseret and Applicaut 
There is one further fact which speaks clearly as to thi· 
entity to which the Applicant really looked as his em· 
ployer. When he sustained his injury, he reporter/ i1 
directly and unhesitatin_q to Terminex which im111ediatd 11 
filed an Employer's First Report of Injury. 
Nelson and plaintiff clearly contracted for NPl".011 
to assume the obligation of providing compensation in 
12 
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surancc ecoverage for applicant, and Nelson did provide 
it. The defense here is by an insurance company which 
seeks to aYoid paying compensation for injury to an em-
ployee on whose wages it has been assessing premium for 
years including the periods he has been engaged in ex-
ndly the activity which produced his injury. 
The evil of this decision is that it adopts a concept 
that any homeowner who contracts for engineering or 
any other professional or semi-professional services and 
giYes direction to the personnel sent to perform the serv-
ices suddenly becomes the employer and subject to all 
the liabilities of an employer. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
By: FRANK J. ALLEN 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
.Attorneys for PlaintijJs 
13 
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